

FAST Update

Somalia

Semi-annual Risk Assessment
July 2005 to January 2006

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
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Country Stability and Forceful Events (relative)



Average number of reported events per month: 110

Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- Country Stability and Forceful Events fluctuated only marginally throughout the reporting period, which was characterized by a continuation of the stalemate between the camps of the divided Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Apart from the chance of holding a parliamentary session in Baidoa, no effective progress has been made in reconciling the parties. Acute tensions have decreased since the military build-up took the country to the brink of renewed civil war in September. But arms purchases continue and inter-factional fighting around the ports in northern Mogadishu and Kismayo has resumed (see third graph). Overall, the process was marked by the President's continued quest for international assistance (including foreign troops), and efforts by his opponents to undermine him, with jihadi islamists exploiting the scenario for their benefit. While the coming weeks present an opportunity to overcome this year-long deadlock, tremendous challenges remain along the way.
- The political process got stuck even before the TFG started moving into Somalia (see previous FAST Update). Neither cabinet nor parliament have met since, and no progress was made in establishing a civil service. Recurrent mediation efforts by the government of Yemen (in June) and the UN Special Representative (in August) failed until a meeting between the President and the Speaker of parliament in January 2006 resulted in the "Aden Declaration". The much applauded document merely stated a plan to convene parliament within a month, not addressing the controversial question of its venue. The Speaker later announced to hold the session in Baidoa on February 26.
- Whether and when the necessary quorum can be achieved will transpire as MPs start flocking into Baidoa from February 15 onwards. So far, the meeting proposed by the President and the Speaker has attracted remarkably little opposition, and prospects of its realization are not too bad. Only Prime Minister Ali Gedi and his kin Mohammed Dheere ("Governor of Jowhar") responded adversely to the venue being Baidoa but have since been persuaded by Ethiopia and the President to support the meeting. The PM is believed to fear a vote of no confidence against him, and together with Mohammed Dheere seeks to hold back as much as possible of the TFG (and associated resources) in their Jowhar fiefdom. Meanwhile, the Speaker of parliament and the local strongman Habsade have arrived in Baidoa. Mogadishu faction leader Osman Ato is said to be with them, and Habsade's RRA opponent Sheikh Madobe was given a public welcome. Lower Shabelle "Governor" Indho Adde, who backs Habsade, is quoted to be in favor of the gathering, but this may well be a tactical statement to undermine the PM.
- Control over and security of the venue is key to the realization and outcome of any such gathering in Somalia. Strikingly, Baidoa is to host MPs from both sides although a member of the Mogadishu group (Habsade) currently has a stronger grip on it. Furthermore, the area is unstable with incidents reported regularly. Habsade apparently fears to lose power in a "friendly take-over" by the massive security forces to


be expected from the President's forces in Luuq, Wajid, Xuddur, Ferfer and Jowhar on the one hand, and from the other faction leaders' in Mogadishu, Merka, etc. on the other. Security matters may still obstruct the session.

- If the meeting takes place as currently expected, shifted alliances and continued divisions will soon be displayed. Provided that the alliance between the Speaker and the President holds forth, and depending on further emerging details of the mysterious Aden deal, divisions are likely to occur/deepen between the President and the men from Jowhar, and between the Speaker and Mogadishu faction leaders. It is difficult to predict how these will translate into the proceedings.
- Ironically, all major stakeholders approach Baidoa with a mixed balance sheet, while their strategies remain divisive: The President has failed to strengthen central government beyond Jowhar. He tends to appear as a hostage of the unpredictable Jowhar strongman, while access to most external resources remains hijacked by the Mogadishu warlords' refusal of cooperation. He has high hopes to push his agenda forward in Baidoa, boosting his quest for international assistance and further marginalizing or co-opting Mogadishu-based faction leaders, possibly by striking a new deal with sections of the Hawiye, and thereby willingly risking his Prime Minister to be sacked. In strategic terms, he may see Baidoa as another step to encircle the capital. Despite the fact that the President is not expected to return to Jowhar before the parliamentary session, and that he will most likely take a good part of his forces to Baidoa, it is not yet clear how deep his divisions with Mohammed Dheere are. The latter is reported to improve his ties with Hiran to enhance his position vis-à-vis Abdullahi Yussuf. Ultimately, the President may put the question of international forces before the TFP again. Any progress on this front, especially setting foot into Baidoa, would advance Abdullahi Yussuf's agenda - with or without the Prime Minister's and Mohammed Dheere's consent.
- The Speaker has failed to stabilize Mogadishu but emerged as an "enlightened leader" – for now the President's key ally – heading a house that will once again be the battleground for Somali leadership. His principal challenge will be to achieve at least nominal support from the leading Mogadishu faction leaders. He shares the President's interest in demonstrating a spirit of unity to address donor conditionality and attract external resources, starting from the first day of the gathering. With some donors this goal may be accomplished regardless of any subsequent outcomes.
- The Mogadishu Group likewise did not succeed to pacify Mogadishu, its cohesion is weak and effective links beyond the capital could hardly be forged. Managing the competition and tacit alliances with Sharia Courts and militant islamists grows more challenging by the day. Furthermore, the ministers failed to establish a Banadir administration under their control. However, they continue to exercise a de facto veto power in the capital, and sufficient leverage to deny the President the image of a united TFG – including the upper hand in Baidoa. While these actors will demonstrate goodwill, avoiding to be singled out as spoilers, and minimizing the risk of being voted out of office, plenty of issue-based exit options will remain. The bottom line is to ensure that the capital remains untouched.
- Meanwhile, the Sharia Courts and militant Islamist groups including Al Ittihad and new jihadi terrorist cells are reported to expand their activity and areas of authority in Mogadishu. These groups are understood to draw political gains from Abdullahi Yussuf's close affiliation with Ethiopia and his urge to deploy foreign troops. A platform referred to as the Somali Union and Salvation Council was established. On the one hand Sharia courts seek to fill the vacuum of public security, on the other hand the reporting period saw a drastic increase of targeted assassinations of officials, allies and supposed collaborators of the Jowhar camp, and similar acts attributed to the more radical elements. While expanding their power base, these groups are keen to keep the TFG dysfunctional. Despite the existence of a quiet coalition of interest with the Mogadishu Group they ultimately compete over power. At the same time, both TFG wings attempt to attract international support portraying themselves as an antidote to militant islamists.
- The military front is marked by continuing arms imports and mobilization efforts. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia in August diagnosed a severely elevated threat of widespread violence in central and southern Somalia. Reports in October indicated that the Jowhar faction had amassed more than 4.500 militias from Puntland, Hiran, Middle Shabelle and Gedo, primarily in camps just south and north of Jowhar as well as in a training camp in Wajid (Bakool) near the Ethiopian border. 800 to 1.000 of these well-equipped militias, and 60 battlewagons were moved to Jowhar in September, triggering a temporary UN withdrawal and reinforcements by Mogadishu ministers and Sharia courts towards Jowhar. Continued Ethiopian and Yemeni assistance in the form of weaponry, training and expertise to the Jowhar wing are reported from various sources. The President is believed to obtain additional imports of vehicles and equipment during his current

stay in Puntland. He is said to aim at accumulating a total of 12.000 soldiers before attempting to take action on Mogadishu. Figures for the Mogadishu "pre-demobilization camps" (read: forward bases) peaked at 2.000 men and 100 technicals in October; but reports indicate that the facilities have been disbanded in the meantime, which should not be confused with reduced military capacity. Efforts to eliminate roadblocks are being reverted simultaneously.

- Especially against this background, the prospects of progress remain grim. The key issues are entirely unresolved while military capacity has multiplied. There is a principle agreement for Parliament to move to Mogadishu but no visible path to get there. The Speaker wants to move within three months, while the President will consider it a long-term goal. The introduction of foreign troops, especially when from neighboring countries, remains highly disputed. The prospect of turning the cabinet into a functional structure is remote. The current President's power will continue to stem primarily from external support translating into military force, and a strong group of opponents will keep obstructing his authority. Parliament being confronted with numerous divisive issues and arising splits provides ample opportunity for active derailment. Unless used to revive and make up for the missed reconciliation process, Baidoa is likely to become just another stop of the tragic Somali political circus.
- The conflict between Puntland and Somaliland over their boundary has calmed down further, although the core issue remains unresolved. While tensions around Somaliland's parliamentary elections in September did not result in armed confrontations along the boundary, and dialogue – facilitated by civil society organizations – enabled the exchange of prisoners of war in December, both governments have recently returned to the rhetoric of conflict by demanding NGOs working in the contested areas to enter through their respective territory.

Cooperative and Conflictive International Events (relative)



Average number of reported events per month: 110


Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- While the graph for Cooperative International Events remained largely unchanged, Conflictive International Events peaked very clearly in October when pirate activity increased.
- IGAD maintained its involvement with Somalia throughout 2005, culminating in a ministerial meeting in Jowhar at the end of November. All member states except Eritrea have come out very clearly in support of the Jowhar leadership, with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti at the forefront of direct diplomatic involvement, and Sudan and Uganda supposed to stand by for the suspended deployment of the first part of an IGADSOM Mission. IGAD also began to train Somali police officers in Uganda and demanded the AU to finance an IGAD Military Observers mission. While IGAD continues to push for the deployment of a foreign force, the contours of the precise scope and tasks of the mission remain blurred although there is a clear threat for the force to be perceived as partisan and IGAD even envisions a robust "peace enforcement" mandate.
- As happened in the past, Somalia appears once again to become a site of the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflict. According to the latest report of the UN Arms Embargo Monitoring Group, Ethiopia is Abdullahi Yussuf's prime supplier of arms, ammunition, training and military expertise. Furthermore, Prime Minister Zenawi has reportedly stated his willingness to deploy up to 10.000 soldiers in Somalia. The UN Group also expressed very clearly, though not explicitly, that Eritrea has sought to counter the Ethiopian influence by supplying Indho Adde (Lower Shabelle), Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys (Al Ittihad) and groups of OLF and ONLF with arms and ammunition. Apart from undermining a coherent IGAD position, these reports testify to the risk that a new war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would pose to the entire region.
- The AU Summits in Sirte and Khartoum, as well as various statements of the AU Peace and Security Council reiterated the organization's willingness to deploy peacekeepers to Somalia at the second stage of a potential mission, taking over from or backing up IGAD. Accordingly, the AU repeatedly made strong calls to the UN Security Council (UNSC) to lift/adapt the UN arms embargo – a step that would be necessary to clear the way for the deployment of foreign troops to assist the TFG President. It also opened a liaison office in Jowhar.
- Despite the efforts from IGAD, the AU and individual member states, the UNSC has so far maintained its strict position. When the matter was discussed in July, the council refused to ease the arms embargo but said it would reconsider the ban after IGAD and AU work out a detailed mission plan. Furthermore, it named consistency with a national security and stabilization plan and the existence of a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire agreement (leading to final disarmament) as conditions for any deployment. Given the Somali stalemate these criteria were impossible to be met, and both AU and IGAD have meanwhile postponed their immediate plans. However, like Abdullahi Yussuf, they have kept the matter on the agenda and there are indications that even the issue of engaging frontline states may be re-emerging.

- The Arab League established a Somalia support fund to the tune of 26 million USD. Yemen and Italy have maintained their support for the TFG President. Yemen admitted a supply of 5.000 personal fire arms (a flagrant violation of the UN embargo) to Jowhar, while Italy is believed to have provided other material assistance. The UN Monitoring Group Report in October recorded some 175 transactions in weapons exchanges over the previous eight months, which it said was a 378 percent increase over the previous year involving 10 ministers and the President of the TFG, Abdullahi Yussuf.
- In October, the TFG leadership attempted to force international flights to land on its own airstrips only. While the move was initially supported by the Kenyan government, it triggered threats by Mogadishu warlords to shoot down planes abiding by the new rules. Flight practices appear unchanged.
- 2005 was marked by a sharp increase of piracy off the Somali coast. The International Maritime Bureau reported 35 incidents between February and October alone. WFP contractors shipping food aid into Somalia were among the primary targets, seriously challenging the organization's logistics. World attention was attracted when pirates sought to capture a tourist cruising ship headed to Mombasa early November, also bringing Kenyan security interest more clearly to the fore. British, Italian, US, French, German and Kenyan forces reportedly stepped up their activities, intensifying patrols and guarding their own ships. At the end of January, a US destroyer engaged an Indian registered dhow with an Indian crew which earlier had been hijacked by 10 Somali pirates. The suspected pirate "mother ship" was taken to Mombasa where the Somalis face trial. In November, the TFG Minister of Fisheries had signed a \$55 million USD two-year contract with "Top Cat", a US private security contractor. It was said to entail creating security bases, training coast guards and Special Forces, as well as conducting boat and air patrols to intercept pirates. Reports of dubious financial practices of the company, threatening US government intervention and the likely lack of finance have meanwhile made the deal unlikely to be realized.
- Mostly as a consequence of drought, international aid agencies estimate 1.5 million people to be in a state of humanitarian emergency in Somalia, and a further 200.000 at a high risk of acute food and livelihood crisis. Piracy and violently contested control over the infrastructure (ports, airports and strategic land routes), pose even more serious challenges to the upcoming expansion of aid operations and commodity imports.
- As Western donors are increasingly divided on how and whether to support the TFG, coherence comes under stress. Some donors appear increasingly inclined to back one side (the President) over the other. However, Somalia is not a scenario where such a strategy will convince or force other groups into submission, especially when the supported party does not provide a clan-inclusive leadership and lacks a spirit of reconciliation and balance of interests. There are plans to hold a donor conference in Rome this year.
- Meanwhile, international cooperation with Somaliland flourished. The country held peaceful parliamentary elections at the end of September, certified as "reasonably free and fair" by international observers. Although immediate changes do not seem to be underway, Western countries have taken strong notice of Somaliland's latest achievement and are reviewing their approaches. Although Ethiopia reiterated its reluctance to recognize Somaliland as an independent state, bilateral relations gained new quality when the Berbera port was inaugurated as an Ethiopian import route in September. Somaliland has meanwhile submitted an official membership application to the African Union, which had dispatched a mission to Somaliland earlier in 2005.

Conflictive and Forceful Domestic Events (relative)



Average number of reported events per month: 110

Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- Overall levels of violence remained more or less unchanged. While Somalia continues its existence of “no peace, no war” at the leadership level, including occasional clashes over territorial spheres of influence, particularly around valuable infrastructure, smaller scale conflicts continue to claim several hundred lives annually. During the reporting period, this included a remarkable amount of fighting over natural resources (grazing land, water points, trees for charcoal).
- Mogadishu continued to be shaken by recurrent armed crime, fighting over roadblocks and taxation, targeted assassinations (see first graph), and a series of inter-factional clashes. The latter were concentrated in the Bondere neighborhood of Northern Mogadishu, where heavy fighting between Bashir Raghe’s forces and Shari’a court militia from Wa’eysle sub clan of Abgaal (under Hajji Abukar Omar Addan) claimed 13 lives early in October, 35 late in December, and another 13 by mid-January. The core issue of the conflict is territorial control, determining taxation income and port access.
- Fighting between militias of the Islamic courts and businessmen over the running of cinemas and related infrastructure formed another hotspot in the capital. Five people were killed in September when masked men opened fire at a local cinema, seven to twelve died in a similar clash in November, and many more were injured when extremists targeting cinemas, music shops and youth parties struck again at the end of that month.
- Outside the capital, the continuing conflict between Sa’ad and Sulayman sub clans of Habargedir took the highest blood toll, in an area stretching all along Southern Mudug and Northern Galguduud regions. Recurrent fighting in Hobyo early August, in Gelinsoor district in December and January, as well as West of Adado, killed a total of up to 113 people and wounded a similar number. This conflict, presumably over disputed grazing land, is now more than 1½ years old and has claimed many lives. It is apparent that more substantial efforts are needed to resolve it in a sustainable manner. An additional five people died in the same area when Marehan militia groups attacked a Suleyman owned water tanker in a village between Adado and Abudwak.
- Similarly, the Marehan - Garre conflict which had claimed more than 70 lives in the first half of 2005 continued, focusing around the town of El Wak (Gedo). After the Marehan united under the involvement of the TFG Minister for Resettlement and Reconstruction, Barre Hiraale, their militia recaptured the town from the Garre at the end of July. The fighting killed 32 and injured 60. The Marehan have maintained their control since. A deal negotiated with the Garre was disturbed by a land mine attack mid-October, killing four passengers of a minibus. Rivalries over the control of this important transit trade route and over representation in the TFG are said to be at the core of the conflict, which inhibited humanitarian access to 15.000 people in the area.

- Mid-January, fresh fighting occurred between the Marehan militia of Barre Hiraale (Reer Kosheen) and Colonel Abdi Egal (Wagardha) in Kismayo, killing at least 20 and wounding 47, including many civilians. The battle was said to have ended with the colonel injured and captured, and 200 of his militia killed, injured or captured. It appears that militia loyal to him are responsible for the hijacking of three Taiwanese vessels and he demanded a share of the JVA's tax revenue. The Ayr/Habargedir elements of the JVA seem to have supported Hiraale's Marehan group against his brethren under Col. Egal's command. Further fighting, killing six, was reported early February.
- Bay and Bakool carried several hotspots during the second half of 2005. 20 people were reportedly killed mid-August and in November in a series of battles for the control over Idale village (Bay), 60km south of Baidoa. For more than a year, Yontar and Hubeyr militias are believed to have been fighting over pasture and wells. Violence between Boqol-Hore and Jilible clan militia (both Rahanweyn) in and around Tiye glow and Sigle (south and southeast of Xuddur/Bakool) killed more than 30 in recurrent fighting in October, December and January. The conflict centers around charcoal rights and land ownership, including Sigle village. These clans already fought in August 2004 over the ownership of the Sigle well used by both sub-clans. In November, fighting erupted in Erenleye village (25km South West of Bardale) between the Laysan and Harow clans of the Rahanweyn, killing six and wounding nine persons as a result of a dispute over a water point. TFG Minister Habsade (Mogadishu group), who controls Baidoa and is supported by the Harow, sent technicals to normalize the situation. Minor clashes also occurred between Haren and Hadama militia, and among the Hadama themselves.
- Hiran region continued to witness occasional fighting. In October, at least 14 people died in new clashes between two sub clans of the Galje'el in Buloburti district, incidents said to relate to a long-standing dispute over grazing land. At the end of November, fighting re-erupted in Beledweyne between two militia groups from the Hawaadle and Baadi Adde clans, killing two.
- Two smaller conflicts occurred in Lower Shabelle. In December, Indha Adde's forces intervened to end hostilities in Tortorow village (Qoryoley district, west of Merka), after eight people had died in fighting between Garre and Jiiddo clan members. Three militias were killed in a fight Wanlaweyn between the local militia group and men loyal to the Balidgole Airstrip Manager.
- The beginning of 2006 saw an unusually high level of violence in Somaliland, including two incidents in Southern Togdheer, killing eight, and a separate land dispute between Arab and Eidagalle (both Issaq) in Hargeisa, killing six people.
- Prospects for 2006 are not good. The continuing rift between and within the factions of the TFG, the planned TFP meeting in Baidoa, possibly shifting alliances and the increasing activities of militant Islamists make the fresh violence of scale very likely. In contrast to earlier periods, such clashes will now take place in a freshly armed and far more mobilized environment, posing a serious risk of unforeseeable or even unintended wider escalation.
- Aid agencies' warning of the deteriorating humanitarian situation, especially in Southern Somalia, paint a particularly worrying scenario. Competition over scarce natural resources increases, and so does the inclination to capture by force what is not shared effectively. Furthermore, the upsurge of piracy (see first graph), fighting near ports in Northern Mogadishu and Kismayo, and the continuing practices of road blocks and looting will not only inhibit expanded aid operations but also carry the risk that humanitarian assistance could once again become embroiled with the Southern war economy.

Country Stability	The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Forceful Domestic Events (relative)	Number of Events (i) that entail the use of physical force against persons or property and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
Conflictive Domestic Events (relative)	Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
Conflictive International Events (relative)	Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
Cooperative International Events (relative)	Number of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
Forceful Events (relative)	Number of Events (i) that entail the use of physical force against persons or property divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.

* The IDEA cooperation-conflict scale is a general weighting that attaches a weight to every event. The scale has a range from -13 to +8. Event types that are regarded as cooperative have positive values, conflictive event types have negative values.

Who are we?

FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Bern, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

What do we want to achieve?

FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers' and their offices' ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding.

How do we work?

FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International's own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts.

What are our products?

FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the FAST Update, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST's country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular FAST Updates. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription.

Which countries do we currently monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia
Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Europe: Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region